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ABSTRACT
SLAYING THE DRAGON: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW TO DISMANTLE A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

By
Caroline Kelly
May 2009

Thesis supervised by Fr. John Sawicki
This paper sets out to prove that by using specific analytical guidelines, the most
effective policy for ending terrorist organizations becomes evident. Factors such as
background information, political and social contexts, motivations, threat analyses,
capabilities, and level of public support are the most important aspects to look at. This is
because each of these factors reveals something specific – a vulnerability, or shortcoming
of the organization that can be exploited.
Furthermore, the three most effective policy options in counterterrorism are
politicization, policing, and military. These policy options are not the sole solutions though.
They are often combined with aspects of another policy, or complimentary strategies such as
intelligence collecting, community reconstruction, social welfare programs, job training,
negotiations, etc.
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The analytical outline will reveal one of these three major policy options as the most
effective and potentially successful strategy for ending a terrorist organization.
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Introduction and statement of the problem
Terrorism has become a threat to international peace and security all over the
world. It is not a new problem but is relevant to United States National Security. While
al-Qaeda and its affiliates – currently the highest profile threat – pose the largest threats
to Islamic and secular nations, they are not impossible to defeat. Terrorist organizations
have been defeated throughout history. The most effective policies and approaches in
defeating terrorism have been politicization, policing and military actions in cooperation
with sub-policies such as economic sanctions on states that harbor terrorists, intelligence
gathering, diplomacy and targeted terrorist killings.1 None of these policies is likely to
work exclusively. Some combination of politicization, policing and military actions will
almost always be used. Yet, certain terrorist groups have proven more susceptible to
efforts that focused principally in one of these three areas or another.
For a state to decide which policy may be most beneficial in confronting a given
terrorist group, the terrorist organization itself must be thoroughly analyzed. There is no
single policy that best fits all cases. Further, for very long-lived terrorist organizations, it
may be that efforts to disband them may shift emphasis from one area to another over
time as the nature of the terrorist group changes. Context matters. Background
information including history, political contexts, social contexts, motivations, public
support, threat analysis and organizational structure are elements of an analysis that best
exploit a terrorist organization’s weaknesses, and can help shape policy decisions.

1

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons in Countering al Qa’ida
(Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 2008), p. 10.
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Choosing the appropriate and most effective policies and sub-policies will be more
successful if the organization can be analyzed from all angles.
This paper will examine three case studies to illustrate conditions in which these
policy approaches have been most effective. Case studies of Aum Shinrikyo, the Irish
Republican Army and al-Qaeda in the Iraqi province of al Anbar will review each
organization and how the analysis guides particular policy options. This will also provide
details of how each of these policies’ work are carried out. From these case studies, it
will be concluded that through carful analysis, and application of the most fitting policy,
terrorist organizations can be defeated.

Operational Definitions:
There are some key definitions that are important to distinguish before proceeding
with this analysis. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is particularly
important. Terrorism is a struggle in which violence is purposely used against civilians
in order to achieve political goals in connection with a delineating nationalistic, religious
and/or socioeconomic component. An insurgency is an insurrection against a
constitutional established power for the purpose of achieving political goals. This is done
by controlling certain populations by force, and influencing the hearts and minds of the
civilians who live there. Insurgents often use terror as a tool to coerce the government
into meeting their demands. In this paper, we consider insurgencies that use terrorism
specifically as their modus operandi. Lastly, for the purposes of this study politicization
refers to the transition from using terrorist tactics to using the political process as a means
of achieving goals.

2

Literature Review
This study draws from many disciplines in the field of terrorism research. These
subject areas include theories on principal policy options, terrorist organizational
compositions and ideologies, as well as examples on how an organization’s make-up
determines the policy options that are most applicable. This paper relies predominately
on secondary sources to lay out the most important theories and empirical data to
reinforce this research. The three main policy options focused on in this paper are
politicization, policing and military use. The theories used in this research come
primarily from Louise Richardson, Seth Jones, Martin Libicki, and Colonel David
Galula.
Louise Richardson, of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard
University, grew up in Northern Ireland at the height of the “Troubles” and went on to
study terrorism all over the world. Her insights are important to this research because she
has studied terrorism in great depth, and her research has focused on aspects of terrorism,
terror organizations and the circumstances in which they operate in ways similar to this
paper. Seth Jones is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct
professor at Georgetown University. Martin Libicki is a senior management scientist at
the RAND Corporation who focuses on the relationship between information technology
and national security. This paper will use Jones’ and Libicki’s methodology and apply
further analytical tools to shape it. Lastly, Colonel Galula served is North Africa, France
and Germany during World War II and was later posted in China. He also served as a UN
military observer in the Balkans during the civil war in Greece, and served as France’s
military attaché in Hong Kong. Most famously, he served in Algeria during Frances
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battles with Islamic revolutionaries in the late 1950s. Here he developed theories and
practices for counterinsurgency that are useful in countering terrorist organizations
operating in a similar mode (e.g., using terrorist violence to change the political
arrangements of a state, as was the case in Algeria in the 1950s when Galula served there,
and still is today). His background gives him first-hand experience with communist
guerrilla strategy and tactics in counterinsurgency.
Next, we briefly review the three major policy options – politicization, policing
and military actions – before examining our three case studies.

Politicization
Politicization has been successful in many circumstances. In How Terrorist
Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki argue
that terrorists believe violence is the only way to reach their goals.2 There might be
alternatives however if an organization’s goals are narrow enough. It is often easier for a
government to negotiate a settlement when terrorists’ goals include reforms in policy
and/or social changes, or when the desired changes are possible for the state3. Note,
however, that there are changes that a state cannot consider without fundamentally
violating its structure and the political philosophies on which it is built. For example, the
political changes demanded by the Taliban in Afghanistan today are for the government
to abandon democracy and, among other things, rights for women, and replace it with an
extremely harsh misogynous theocracy. In circumstances such as this, political
accommodation is not possible.

2
3

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 18.
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In circumstances in which political accommodation is possible, the government
incurs less costs in negotiations than in employing counter force or acceding to terrorists’
demands.4 Opening up to negotiations could potentially save money, resources, and most
importantly lives. Therefore if negotiations are possible it is often in the state’s best
interest to engage. This method usually appeases the general population as well, because
the continuation of terror badly affects the community. Many would rather not endure
lasting violence. Also, when the political arena becomes available to terrorist
organizations, terrorism is no longer the sole way of meeting their demands.5 Being
involved in politics gives terrorists alternate methods of expressing their concerns and
grievances, and allows them to participate in making change. Terrorism is a tactic used
for asymmetric warfare – when the organization does not have enough power to influence
or take on the state. This changes when terrorist groups are allowed access to the
political process.
Another example of when politicization may be the preferred method is when a
state’s police and/or military is not efficient enough to dissolve the terrorist organization
by military or police means, but, the organization cannot achieve victory using its tactics.
When violent operations become useless, terrorists must find another method to be
effective. In this case, initiating change through the political system can yield better
results.

4
5

Ibid., p. 24.
Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 10.
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Louise Richardson also sees political measures as a significant policy option for
countering terrorist organizations and argues this theory in Democracy and
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. 6 She believes negotiations between the
government and terrorist organizations can arrive at compromises and concessions for the
sake of ending resistance, and bring about socioeconomic and political reforms. This is
effective with the organization and reaches the targeted open society. Those who would
otherwise support terrorists, such as sympathetic civilians, will get behind the political
agenda to enact change, but international cooperation, extradition agreements, police
borders and intelligence efforts must accompany negotiation.

Policing
Jones and Libicki found that when the transition to nonviolence cannot be made
politically, police force is most effective. The exception is insurgencies because when
the organization is too large, trained in guerrilla warfare, or too well armed. Police are
effective because they can more easily gain information on organizational structure,
tactics, strategies and membership than politicians and military forces.7 Argo they are
more integrated into the community and are trained to do this. For example, police may
have records of previous offenses of those in terrorist groups (very often, terrorists have
transgressed the law in the past) and so can more easily track potential terrorists. Often,
they can use the law to their advantage and incarcerate potential terrorists on other
charges such as fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking and assault.8 When the
military is used, the community can often be intimidated, or feel repressed and
6

Ibid.
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, p. 9.
8
, Russell D. Howard, et.at. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment: Readings and Interpretations 3rd Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009), p. 531.
7
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sympathize with the terrorists’s cause.9 Police, however, are already a familiar face in
many circumstances, whether threatening to an individual or not. Unless they are tools of
oppression in an authoritarian state police are less intimidating than soldiers.
Furthermore, police have the advantage of being able to lobby for antiterrorist legislation
to aid their efforts.10 Legislation can involve modest standards for search and seizures,
surveillance privileges and criminalizing other activities that terrorists need to function.
This policy option encompasses the standard police operations, collecting intelligence,
capturing key leaders, passing legislation and using the assistance of foreign actors.
Richardson acknowledges the need for police and appropriate laws in the fight
against terrorist organizations.11 She further advocates special legislation to increase
government and police power to arrest and detain suspects, and to gain intelligence. Such
police action includes disrupting finances and other petty crimes that terrorists use to
finance their operations.

Military
Richardson emphasizes the military as a tool to be used against terrorists. The
military can be used both to protect civilians and to engage in direct fighting with the
terrorists themselves. Along with military action, there is a great need for intelligence
(e.g., human, signals, satellite).12

9

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, p. XIV.
Boaz Ganor, The Counter-terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick:
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Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 183.
11
12

Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, p. 17.
Ibid., p. 8.
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Colonel Galula expresses a useful theory on this subject in Stephen T. Hosmer
and Sibylle Crane’s Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962. Insurgents
often use terrorist tactics and must be dealt with carefully. An insurgent’s goal is to
control a population, and is usually successful when conducted in a state with a weak
government and incompetent police force. 13 Population control usually starts in areas
distant from the central government where the local population is already supporting the
terrorists or insurgents. The bases that many insurgencies create are often also centers of
operations and political unity. From these bases, insurgents devise plans for guerrilla
warfare and as they spread and reach larger populations – they expand their operations.
In many circumstances, such as in Iraq and Palestine, strong parties will emerge and use
terrorist tactics to achieve political concessions.
The military is essential in circumstances such as these where the terrorists have
significant military potential themselves. This is because in most cases police forces are
not strong enough alone to defeat insurgents, and the insurgents’ goals are too outlandish
to be able to negotiate. In cases such as this, terrorists will simply kill the police – as we
see in Mexico today. Galula believes militaries should recognize that insurgents are not
mobile, because if they leave an area they potentially lose control of the population. The
military must push insurgents back from their occupied areas and create an alternative
political party so that returning insurgents would not have a hold on that element of
society.14 A good example is the province of al-Anbar in Iraq. There, the people were
dissuaded from supporting al-Qaeda and the U.S. military could drive their overt

13

Stephen Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962
(Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 1963), pp. 2-3.
14
Ibid., p. 4.
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presence temporarily from population centers. Because of this, the population turned
against al-Qaeda, and it now has no lasting support in that region and no influence on the
area. The local tribes kept them out by these initiatives.
Counterterrorism measures are particularly difficult if terrorism has gone
unmanaged for too long because it is nearly impossible to collect intelligence once the
terrorists have established firm control over an area.15 Terrorists/insurgents become
familiarized with the area and with members of the society, so intelligence officers would
be immediately recognized and the operation would be unsuccessful. Guerrillas would
have already contaminated the minds of the civilians who often are struck already with
fear and so are less likely to divulge information that could be useful to counterterrorist
forces. If counter measures begin at the onset of the conflict, however intelligence can
take hold in the community clandestinely – before the terrorists/insurgents become too
familiarized with their atmosphere. A successful counterinsurgency must have better
intelligence than the insurgents which is mainly achieved through having the support of
the community or tribal group. In this way the majority of the community will provide
more support to the party conducting the counterterrorism efforts. That majority can
influence a hostile minority and neutralize it.
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki support Colonel Galula’s theory that military use is
mostly successful in the case of terrorist insurgencies.16 Insurgent groups tend to be
larger, with a more goal-oriented focus on seizing power. Jones and Libicki theorize that
insurgents tend to have mid-level goals. Police alone are not sufficient with these types
15

16

Ibid., p. 5.
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, p. 8.
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of groups because insurgents are often well armed and highly motivated, and police are
outnumbered.
Barry Posen argues in “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy,
Strategy, and Tactics” that the military is important to counter al-Qaeda in its entirety. 17
Affiliates and cells of al-Qaeda operate differently than many previous terrorist groups,
and it would not be possible for the United States, or any modern nation, to negotiate
peace with al-Qaeda. Military force may not always be the best choice either. Posen
does acknowledge police action, but stresses police intervention as a means of gaining
intelligence. Police forces know their surroundings and people often feel comfortable
with police working in their communities. Nonetheless, the police role should not be
limited to intelligence.18

Group Assessment
Louise Richardson’s book, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from
the Past is particularly helpful in distinguishing different types of terrorist organizations.
She researches and analyzes revolutionary, ethno-nationalist and religious or millenarian
organizations. After describing these groups’ goals and strategies, she analyzes various
policy approaches that have attempted to counter these organizations. Her research
complements the thesis of this study by supporting the theory that policy makers should
identify a group’s underlying motivations and tactics before choosing counterterrorism

17

Barry Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” International
Security, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 39-55, Winter 2001/2002, p. 42.
18
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, pp. xiii-xiv.
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procedures. 19 She describes the structure, motivations, downfalls and successes due to
government action in a selection of groups. 20
Furthermore, in What Terrorists Want, Louise Richardson makes a connection
between an organization’s goals and how difficult they are to defeat.21 In her discussion,
goals are broken down into two categories: temporal and transformational. She describes
temporal goals as political goals that can be met without overthrowing the entire political
system, and in particular are narrow enough to occasionally permit negotiations. Terror
groups that hold such goals appear to be largely nationalist groups such as ETA, IRA,
and LTTE. On the other hand, transformational goals are not able to be negotiated, as
they require changes that cannot be adopted within the political structure of the state.22
Examples of these include Communist groups’ war against capitalism and those who
wish to impose Shari’a law on – and in some cases create a Caliphate in – the
contemporary Middle East and other Muslim regions.
Another connection that Louise Richardson emphasizes is the relationship
between the organization and community. Organizations that are isolated from their
communities are usually easier to defeat because they lack financial and logistical
support. These types of groups have members who are more likely to defect or splinter
into other groups. They are largely left-wing extremists such 17 November in Greece,

19

Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, p. 7.
Studies include: Red Brigades, IRA, ETA (Basque group in Northern Spain), GIA (Islamic group in
Algeria), FALN-FLN, FARC, Hamas, Israel, Fatah, Hezbollah, PKK, Chechen terror groups in Russia
and Chechnya, LTTE, and Aum Shinrikyo
21
Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want (New York: Random House 2006) p. 17.
22
Ibid., p. 13
20
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FMLN, FARC, GRAPO and the Zapatistas.23 Groups that have closer ties with their
communities are more dangerous because community members may share the same
political or ideological views – or some other bond such as tribal or ethnic loyalties even
if they do not partake in terrorism. Furthermore, when the police or military search for
terrorists it is unlikely citizens who are loyal to the organization’s people or cause will
offer assistance.
Colonel David Galula, a key contributor in Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle
Crane’s book, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium. He also gives an in depth account of
how military operations were successful in Algeria in Pacification in Algeria 19561958.24 In Hosmer and Crane’s book, as well as in his own Counterinsurgency
Warfare, Theory and Practice,25 Col. Galula gives operational counterinsurgency
theory. But in Pacification in Algeria, he gives analyses on how those theories are put
into practice. Accounts of how the population in Algeria was controlled and supported
by the French highlighted military success in counterterrorism efforts. Col. Galula’s
theory works on paper and in the field. He demonstrated the military options can be a
successful tactic in insurgencies involving terror tactics.
Similarly, R. W. Komer presents a military case study which is a
counterinsurgency success in The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of
a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort.26 What is important in this account of
counterinsurgency are the patterns of insurgent operation, factors that made insurgency
23

Antifascist Resistance Groups October First (GRAPO) is a Spanish Maoist group.
David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 1963).
25
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: Greenwood Publishing
Group, 1964).
26
R.W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency
Effort (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 1972).
24

12

favorable as a tactic, responses to the insurgency by the military and necessary policy
implications that followed.27

Conceptual Framework:
The independent variables in this study are the three principal policy options –
politicization, policing and military action, supported by various sub-policies such as
diplomacy, international support, economic sanctions and social relief. The analysis of a
group’s characteristics and the context in which they operate, plus the most effective
combination of principal and sub-policy suggestions, should produce an effective policy
that can overcome terrorism. The dependent variable is terrorist activity.
This study focuses on several types of terrorist organizations ranging across a
spectrum of ideologies and political orientations, including left-wing and right-wing
political movements, religious and nationalist ideological motivations, and groups that
seek to change economic conditions and regime types. Selecting a policy option requires
identifying those characteristics of a terrorist organization. This includes its background
features, political and social contexts, and threat capabilities, that affects its success, and
connecting these policy options causally to a decrease in terrorist activity – the dependent
variable.
To match an independent variable with a dependent variable, this paper adopts an
approach based on qualitative research. The goal is to analyze individual terrorist

27

Note that the Malayan Emergency and the British response to it present one of the best examples in
which military, political and police efforts were used almost in a perfect balance to defeat an insurgency.
On the political side, the British pledged, and did, give independence to Malaya. The British and the
Malayan government passed special laws to support counter-terror and counter-insurgency efforts, and
rigorously insisted on doing everything according to the rule of law. Special Branch police forces were
created, whose efforts were fundamental in identifying and routing out insurgent political structures.
And, military operations hunted and defeated insurgent terrorists in the jungles.
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groups’ characteristics and actions, and use this information and what we know about
past counter-terrorism efforts to construct adequate policy options. Specifically, we
want to show that by (A) identifying the key characteristics of an organization and (B)
matching policy options that have been successful in the past for terrorist organizations
with similar characteristics, then this will lead to the defeat of the terrorist organization
under consideration (C). We do this by considering the three case studies outlined above,
and what they tell us about which approaches work best against groups with certain
characteristics.

Research Design:
To set up the basis of this research, we will use relevant theories and expert
explanations of how to counter terrorism, and will collect data regarding past events
through several second-hand accounts of past counterterrorism efforts. This is
descriptive and explanatory research, where variables will be tested against each other to
make assertions about current and future terrorist threats. The research will observe and
assess policy options that governments have used in the past to quell the terrorism that
plagued their states. Terrorist organizations are motivated by anything from political and
social surroundings, ethnicity, nationality and religion. The measurements being studied
will have taken place throughout history, up until what is going on today.

Analysis
The main analysis in this study uses background information including history,
political and social contexts, and major stakeholders. Threat analysis will focus primarily
on terrorist organizational structure, public support and operational capabilities. This
outline for analysis covers the most crucial factors of an organization and selectively
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rules out inappropriate policy options and conclusions. The observer may learn a lot
about the organization’s weaknesses by studying the data provided by this analysis.
In the background segment of analysis, a lot can be said for a group’s history, and
the political and social context in which it operates. For example, the non-elite
Salvadorians were oppressed by the Salvadorian government for decades in ways that
harmed innocent civilians in El Salvador. This left many peasants with a laundry list of
grievances. From 1880 until 1992, El Salvador’s political and economic structure was an
elitist agrarian society. When people began to protest in the 1970’s, they were met with
extreme violence and terror from their government.28 This violent, and intimidating
lifestyle had deep roots in peasant history in El Salvador. Their political and economic
culture is what spurred the grievances that led to the creation of the FMLN. Because the
FMLN’s grievances were rooted in a history of labor-repressiveness and class injustice,
political negotiations were of most interest to them.29 Groups that seek political
concessions usually have narrow goals such as regime change or social justice. In this
case, history and social and political contexts showed that democratic transition, land
reform and civil rights negotiations could address the terrorist and the popular grievances.
The Irish Republican Army was also motivated by a desire for political change.
Catholics sought equal rights and autonomy.30 Because their goals were specific, Great
Britain allowed the IRA to use the political arena as opposed to proscription to fight their
civil battles. Granting the IRA the opportunity to use the political arena gave them a

28

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, pp. 64-65.
Ibid., p. 23
30
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Niwot: Roberts Rinehart Publlishers, 1993), p. 260.
29
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civil fighting ground that did not require the use of violence in open society. As a result,
terrorist activities lost some of their appeal.

Threat analysis:
A terrorist organization’s structure can indicate possible policy strategies to
dismantle it. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, was centered on a single leader, Shoko
Asahara, who believed himself to be the equivalent of Jesus Christ or Buddha. He was
the spiritual guru and prophetic leader of the organization.31 Once law enforcement
caught up with Aum and Shoko Asahara the organization crumbled. Without the leader,
the followers did not have a path to follow.
In other circumstances, when the key leader(s) are assassinated or captured, the
organization might not collapse, but it does become weakened. This gives government,
police or military forces a temporary advantage. Capture of key al-Qaeda figures has
temporarily reduced the organization’s operational capabilities.32 Furthermore, since 9/11
more key leaders have been targeted and assassinated – weakening al-Qaeda’s ability to
plan, finance and support operations.33 Cutting the head off the hydra has not ended alQaeda, but it has disrupted the organizational structure and has rattled and reduced alQaeda’s functional ability.
Public support can make or break an organization and can be dangerous to a
state’s policy efforts for many reasons. Like Irish Nationalists with the IRA, citizens can
resist intelligence collection from the government against their freedom fighters and
31

Brian Jackson et.al. Aptitude for Destruction: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five
Terrorist Groups (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 2005), p.11.
32
Angel Rabasa et.al. Beyond Al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement (Washington DC: Rand
Corporation, 2006), p. 31.
33
Ibid., p. 32
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signal members when troops are coming.34 This phenomenon is not unique. Filipino
peasants also warned insurgents about approaching Japanese soldiers during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines in WWII.35
Political context matters. In Afghanistan immediately after 9/11, the political
structure was so fragmented and the nature of the Taliban government so inimical to U.S.
interests, that military operations were the only option. Since the Taliban was
overthrown the government has been too weak to employ any kind of coherent, honest
police force. Operation Enduring Freedom was able to successfully drive the Taliban and
al-Qaeda into the hills of Pakistan with military force.36 The military was the sole option.
Politicization has also had problems. Although negotiations have been suggested by
Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, it is difficult to determine with whom to negotiate
to cause the violence to abate as there are many groups with different leaders.37
Furthermore, negotiations work best when the government is strong and viable not when
it is weak and dependent on outside assistance. Given Afghanistan’s history and current
state, and because of this enduring weakness of the state and the police, military force
continues to be a major element of the counter-terror efforts.
Lack of public support can harm a terror organization. In the Malayan
insurgency, the insurgents failed to gain the support of the largely Indian population. Not
only did they oppose the insurgents, but they supported the government so strongly that

34

Brian Jackson et.al. p. 128.
Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane, p. 25.
36
John Brown, “The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom October 2001March 2002,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003, p. 26.
37
Ibid., p. 4.
35
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many enlisted in the government’s security forces.38 This also made the government’s
ability to collect intelligence more efficient than that of the insurgents.
Operational capabilities matter in determining an effective counterterrorism
policy. If an organization is well armed and has many members successful counter
measures may be too difficult for police to undertake alone. When an organization’s
membership is more than 1,000 some experts assert that the most effective strategy is
usually military. In the Algerian Insurgency, for example, the FLN regular forces
throughout all Algeria were about 5,000 strong at the height of the conflict. When there
are fewer than 1,000 members police often have the resources to deal with the threat.39

Limitations:
There are multiple limitations in this research. First of all, due to time constraints
this study was only able to select a handful of organizations to analyze. With more time,
we may find that with a larger sample of organizations there are inconsistencies.
Furthermore, there are aspects of organizations that do not reflect in this analysis such
aspects as financing and personal backgrounds of individual members. These are details
that could potentially be significant in prescribing a solution if given adequate analysis.
Also, I did not account for the amount of terrorist groups that succeed, or splinter into
other organizations, or how and when this most likely happens.
Furthermore, specific types of organizations are more or less prone to certain
policy options. For example, religious organizations tend to be less flexible in
compromising their goals. Because they see themselves as working as emissaries for a
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higher purpose there is little that can deter these characters. It is possible that common
denominators can be drawn about various types of organizations: religious, ethnonationalists, left/right wing, Marxists-Leninists, etc.

Irish Republican Army Case Study
Background
Historical
In 1920, the Irish War of Independence resulted in the partition of Ireland. A
treaty called the Government of Ireland Act was signed in 1921 by minister of finance for
Sinn Fein, Michael Collins to give all but six northern Irish states autonomy.40 Southern
Irish states that had gained autonomy were consolidated as the Irish Free State, later
renamed the Republic of Ireland. Although Michael Collins (Fein Party member) had
hoped for an independent Ireland, he believed this treaty marked progress.41 Many
Northern Irish were divided at this point, not only because of controversy over whether or
not it was acceptable to sign the treaty, but because in signing it, they had to swear on an
oath to pledge their allegiances to the British Crown. Michael Collins was assassinated
because of this split between interests.42
While the Republic of Ireland functioned independently of the United Kingdom,
the six counties in the North were still subjected to British rule. In the 1960s, Catholics
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had accepted their disposition and dedicated their fight to gaining equal rights within
Northern Ireland.
Ireland denied civil rights to Catholics until the 1960’s when Captain Terence
O’Neill became Prime Minister of Stormont and worked to build bridges between the two
traditions.43 This era was known as the Era of Tolerance, because a minor group of
Unionists began to reach out to the Catholics. Although O’Neill’s ideas influenced
many, his administration’s intentions were not put into action by Protestant Unionists.
Catholics realized that reform would not take place without a push, so under the influence
of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, they began non-violent
demonstrations. Under the O’Neill administration, the Irish Civil Rights Movement did
achieve voting reforms; however, the Unionists began to feel threatened.44 They
suspected that the request for civil rights was merely a distraction meant to mask the
Nationalist plans for a united Ireland.45 Because of this notion, the government reacted
against other demands for civil rights for the Catholics, such as decent housing and job
opportunities. Also, the British introduced internment – the indefinite incarceration
without trial of those suspected of violent associations – in Ireland to contain anticipated
Irish violence associated with these demonstrations.
Northern Ireland’s reserve police, Ulster Special Constabulary (B-Specials) and
British military soldiers were sent to maintain “Protestant law, and Protestant order” in
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response to the civil rights protests.46 This deployment of troops and misconduct from
the police, along with the effective demise of the Real IRA (discussed below) led to the
organization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
Prior to 1970, the Real Irish Republican Army occasionally launched an attack
against the British, but often gave warning before attacks to avoid civilian injury, or
targeted infrastructure such as bridges in Northern Ireland. The RIRA steadily dissolved
into the political process, never committing whole-heartedly to violent resistance to the
British.47 When Catholic civilians were being harassed, many would look to their
community as their only security (members of the IRA), but they were hardly active. In
fact, they were scarce. The community started to say that the IRA stood for “I Ran
Away.” It’s about this same time that PIRA was formed from remnants of what the IRA
used to be.48
The arrival of British troops in Northern Ireland meant that many unemployed,
impoverished and disenfranchised Catholics would only have each other for defense.
Under internment law reenacted by Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister Brian Faulkner
any individual suspected of being an IRA member was imprisoned without formal
charges or a trial.49 Because the police and British military often acted unethically and
had an unspoken loyalty to the Protestants, Catholics often created “no-go” areas – areas
that were barricaded from outsiders so that Protestants could not enter. This gave the
IRA an environment to organize and convene without interruption. In response to these
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“no-go” zones in both Belfast and Derry, Operation Motorman was launched, in which
the British Army forced their way into these Catholic neighborhoods.50 They often found
little to no resistance from the nationalists who were significantly less trained and not
well armed.51 Bloody Sunday further escalated Catholic distain for the British presence.
When Catholics gathered in Derry on Jan. 30, 1972 for a civil rights protest, the British
Army’s First Parachute Regiment open fired on an unarmed, peaceful civil rights
demonstration, killing 13 unarmed Irishmen. The Catholic community also suggested
that those killed by the British on Bloody Sunday were neither armed, nor IRA
members.52
Lastly, in the escalation of the Troubles was the death of many prisoners
conducting a hunger strike. These strikers fasted indefinitely in order to be recognized as
political prisoners. Bobby Sands was among the first to die from the strike because
Margaret Thatcher refused to give any concessions to terrorists, and believed that a crime
is a crime, despite the ideology it is committed in the name of. Bobby Sands did,
however, win a seat in Westminster right before his death.53
By looking at the background of the IRA and the background of Catholic
Nationalists in general, it is easy to understand what the main issues were. Whether their
motivations were legitimate or not, it is plain to see that the IRA sought equal rights to
Protestant Loyalists and devolved control of their government. In this detail alone it is
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obvious that with narrow political goals, politicization would be a potentially successful
policy.

Political Factors
Key players
The Protestant side of the conflict was made up of those nominally loyal to Great
Britain. The political parties affiliated with the loyalists were the Ulster Unionist Party
(UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The UUP was the more moderate of
the two and for the majority of the conflict was led by David Trimble. The DUP was
slightly more hard-line and led by Ian Paisley. Also on this side of the conflict, two
major paramilitary organizations paralleled the IRA. Those were the Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA). There were various smaller, lesserknown organizations, and the parties and paramilitaries often worked in collaboration as
did the Catholic parties and paramilitaries.54 The Social Democratic and Labor Party
(SDLP) was the most prominent of the Catholic political parties, followed narrowly by
Sinn Fein (the more hard-line party) led by Gerry Adams. The more hard-liners were
considered nationalists. Sinn Fein also acted as the political arm of the IRA. The IRA
discussed in this paper is the Provisional Irish Republican Army unless otherwise noted.
It emerged from the Original IRA and the Real IRA. The PIRA served as the Catholic
nationalist’s paramilitary terrorist organization.55
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Threat Analysis
Organizational Structure
The IRA was originally structured as a bureaucratic hierarchy that distributed
roles to members based on how much power and influence they had within the
organization. The highest ranking body of the IRA was the General Army Convention.
Acting under the General Army Convention were the Army Executive and the Army
Council, which oversaw strategic and tactical developments. Both the Army Executive
and Army Council were positions assigned by elections. The Army Council elected a
chief of staff who was granted the most authority over the organization. The General
Headquarters acted as an executive. It was responsible for implementing and executing
the Army Council’s decisions. The General Headquarters contained two divisions, the
Northern and Southern Commands. Because British intelligence tried to infiltrate the
IRA however, they evolved into a cell structure. Each cell functioned as a franchise of
the overall corporation.56
In this case, organizational structure is an important part of the analysis because it
illustrates one of many examples of how the British military and intelligence were
incapable of suppressing the IRA. Specifically, the British failed in trying to infiltrate
and put down the terrorists. Because of the IRA’s evolutionary ability intelligence could
never pin down a significant number of members, activities or operations for the military
to interdict. Once British troops or intelligence officers started to get too close, their
organization would adjust its structure to protect itself.
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Public Support
Even though the major issue of concern to nationalists for the duration of the
conflict was sovereignty and self-rule, this is not what led to the outbreak of the Troubles.
The Troubles began because of the British reaction to the Catholic civil rights movement.
Catholics did not have equal rights compared to Protestants. Example of the inequalities
that Catholics lived with include things such as housing and employment opportunities,
and being unable to participate in local government.57 Because the Catholics were trying
to gain equality loyalists were afraid of losing power to nationalists if they were to get
their way. When British troops arrived to maintain order, loyalists acted quickly to form
relationships with them. Because of the collaboration between British troops and
loyalists, troops often overlooked loyalist misconduct toward the Catholics or disregarded
Catholics’ rights. Rather than settling chaotic disputes, nationalist grievances were often
exacerbated by British actions that made already festering grievances worse. This
resulted in the Catholic populations resenting the British military and police rather than
helping them.58 Because the United Kingdom deviated from democratic practices and the
rule of law, grievances and hostilities rose. And because the IRA was the Catholics’ only
protection, support from the Catholic public rose. The principal events that resulted in
the rise of recruitment and volunteers, as well as public support, were the introduction of
internment, curfews, Operation Motorman, Bloody Sunday, and the Royal Ulster
Constabulary’s (RUC) “shoot to kill” policy.59 A large part of the problem was that the
British army and police forces took more than just support for loyalists. They were
believed, and we now know proven, to be in collusion with loyalist anti-Catholic terrorist
57
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organizations in Northern Ireland such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the
Ulster Defense Association (UDA). These biases can be seen by the number of Catholics
put in internment camps versus the number of Protestants. This same bias applied to
arrests and investigations. Many UDA and UVF members were even discovered to be on
the British Army’s payroll.60
One of the United Kingdom’s major problems in putting down the IRA was the
nationalist public’s support for the organization. For this reason, even those who did not
approve of the IRA’s tactics supported its cause.61 Support for the IRA stretched to
sympathizers in the Republic of Ireland and the United States.
Social factors, including the IRA’s level of public support and further motivations
shows another angle of how the British military campaign was unsuccessful. Because
nationalists in Northern Ireland were largely oppressed, and had minimal rights and no
one to defend them against injustices, the IRA was able to take advantage of these
circumstances. First of all, because of its support domestically and abroad, the IRA
received donations in the form of money, volunteers and ammunition. Also, it was able
to train, meet and plan with some level of secrecy. When citizens saw British coming,
they would often warn the IRA.62 Public support also legitimatized nationalist
motivations and grievances, and in turn always ensured a high number of volunteers.
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Capabilities
The IRA’s capabilities grew as weapons became more available. In addition to
imported weapons, the IRA often made their own bombs. IRA members were frequently
killed either making or detonating homemade bombs. Jack McCabe, for example, was
the only expert bomb maker at the time and blew himself up while mixing explosives on
the floor of his garage with a shovel. Before he died he passed on to others what went
wrong with his experiment so that others could carry on bomb-making capabilities. In
1969, the IRA only owned 10 guns.63 Myles Shevlin was the only weapons smuggler in
the early years who had been involved with any version of the IRA since the 1950s.
Explosives failures were so common that in the beginning more IRA members were
killed by their bombs than were targets, which is accredited to the level of expertise and
the type of unstable explosive being used. By risky and often fatal endurance through
trial and error, fatalities from explosives failures were nearly eliminated.64
Because IRA bombs were low technology and easily detected by police new
innovations had to be created. As munitions technology became available the IRA had
units that specialized in explosives manufacturing and supplying munitions to the cells.
Eventually, bombing skills progressed to remote manual detonations and to automatic
detonations.65
The IRA received weapons from sympathizers in the United States and from the
Middle East. Libya provided several shipments of arms to the IRA in order to punish the

63

Tim Pat Coogan, p. 279.
Ibid., p. 283.
65
Brian Jackson, et.al. p. 100.
64

27

British for letting the Americans use their bases to facilitate bombing raids on Tripoli.66
The IRA General Headquarters also learned how to use foreign contacts and the
international arms market after many failed attempts and embarrassing mistakes. In later
years as their skills in these facilitation tasks improved, the IRA acquired mortars,
rockets, sniper rifles and machine guns. When desired weapons could not be obtained,
they were manufactured within the organization – a capability that the IRA also
developed over time.67
An analysis of capabilities is important in order to know what scale of violence
any government is up against, and therefore how much violence it may need to employ in
response. Depending on the organization’s ability to acquire weapons, train personnel,
stockpile weapons, and conduct similar institutional tasks different levels of government
forces are necessary to counter them. For example and as previously noted, police forces
are usually not capable of taking on large, well-armed organizations. In the case of a
large-scale insurgency for example, the military is the only institution trained and well
enough armed to match such a level of violence. The IRA was able to either develop
weapons internally or use the global market to acquire them. It did not employ
insurgency tactics, which is what the British military specialized in countering.

Outcome
What kept the British from being able to suppress the IRA for over 30 years?
The British followed an approach that could be thought of as trial and error. For
almost thirty years, the British tried with little success to use its military and police
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forces. This did not work for a variety of reasons. First, military presence intimidated
the community. The British army was well skilled in counterinsurgency. In an open
society however the military failed in many respects.68 An example of this was one of the
few occasions British troops opened fired on unarmed Catholics. Instead of
demonstrating superiority and power for the British it gave Catholics all the more reason
to fight. The military and police forces used undemocratic and unethical procedures.
While originally welcomed as protectors, they turned quickly into the common enemy.69
By issuing curfews, internment, “shoot to kill” policies and the like, military presence in
and of itself was to the Catholics a physical threat on their lives, their communities, and
their ability to function normally in everyday life. The Catholics came to see British
troops as the threat and as terrorists themselves. Had the British government analyzed
the situation in Northern Ireland more thoroughly they may have concluded that their
efforts were going against their goals. Not only were the Catholic grievances not
accommodated, but they were perpetuated by the military.
Military and police misconduct helped further IRA recruitment and support for
the IRA. Catholic citizens would warn IRA members when police were coming by
hanging towels on their balconies, or banging pots and pans. The public’s support
legitimized their cause, provided safe havens undetectable to intelligence, provided
money and solidified the crusading spirit.
The IRA adapted well to the times, to the operating environment and to British
counterterrorism efforts. Because of the IRAs organizational learning capabilities, the
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military and police could never solidify a specific plan. When bombs started to be
detected by the military or police, the IRA developed better technology to avoid
detection. They sought munitions abroad, or experimented themselves to seek
alternatives. Eventually they were able to acquire less detectable remote manual
detonation bombs, and then even to automatic detonation bombs.70
Also, when the IRA’s original organizational structure was penetrated, they
reorganized from a hierarchical bureaucracy to a cell structure. Their Green Book
(training manual) further gave instructions on how to prevent infiltration. An example of
this was to never talk about the IRA, politics, or the British in public. They were warned
against talking about these sensitive subjects even around other Catholics who might be
supportive of their motivations and goals. In this way, the British intelligence could
never pick out members while conducting surveillance or human intelligence.
Furthermore, they developed their own infiltration skills such as positioning members in
government offices to get inside information on counterterrorism policies, or knowledge
of intelligence planning.71 They also learned to pass cryptic messages using the
telephone and tap wires monitored by security services. In another area, the IRA learned
and trained members in how to manipulate forensic science. In conclusion, the IRA acted
as a well trained, well staffed military, and although the British military was a match for
the IRA, they never got passed military stalemate.
Although the IRA’s initial weapons capacity mostly consisted of sticks and
stones, their abilities significantly improved over time until they were able to stalemate
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the British military.72 High and close to equal casualties were accumulated on both sides,
and though the Catholics had a smaller population, there was never a lack of volunteers.
73

Why did politicization end up being most effective?
Violence was no longer the only means of achieving their goals. Once
negotiations reconvened (from previous secret negotiations in the 70s), and the
republicans were taken seriously, the Catholic position was validated by the public
attention. This gave nationalists another route for achieving its goals. The IRA’s
objectives were all political and temporal, and therefore were best served in a political
arena. Validating the concerns of the Northern Irish early on could have made a
difference in support levels. When it did occur, it made Catholics aware that they were
being included, as opposed to excluded from decision making. By listening to Catholics
the government could have had a better appreciation of their needs and their grievances
(the British government was often unaware of the misconduct of its own troops and of the
Stormont government in Northern Ireland). For example, allowing Catholics into the
police force helped to neutralize many grievances, along with other basic civil rights
demands. Also, after getting over the initial road blocks in negotiations, parties were able
to feel each other out, and communicate on a mutually respectable and realistic level.

Conclusion
This case study shows that an analysis of the organization’s characteristics can
imply an appropriate counterterrorism policy. From each analytical category, particularly
useful information can be derived. In this case, it is apparent from the background alone
72
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that politicization may be most successful. In the background we find that Catholic
Nationalists have been oppressed by the majority Protestants, supported by the British
government. They wanted to gain equal rights and an equal say in the country they see as
theirs. Jones and Libicki would characterize these motivations as relatively narrow goals,
and Richardson as temporal goals. When goals are narrow enough, and these are so,
negotiations are effective. This is what the British government came to find in the
process leading up to the signing the Good Friday Agreement. By devolving some
control of Northern Ireland to Northern Ireland, and establishing equal rights (in the
forms of housing, employment opportunities, etc.) many Catholics felt appeased. Their
grievances were validated and their method for addressing them amended.
Military and police efforts were less effective for good reasons. Analysis of the
IRA’s organizational structure shows the group’s resilience. Because the British were
consistently trying to collect intelligence and infiltrate the organization, the IRA had to
adapt to dodge Britain’s intelligence efforts. Because of the IRA’s evolutionary ability,
the British faced significant challenges in finding out the number of members, activities
or operations being planned. Once British troops or intelligence officers started to get too
close, their organization would adjust its structure to protect itself. Throughout the
“Troubles,” the British never gained significant hold on the IRA. While many members
were captured, and various operations were stopped before they could be deployed,
overall British and Unionist military and police efforts were not successful enough to end
the IRA as a terrorist organization. Because the IRA was able to defeat these military
and police efforts, and because the IRA’s goals were addressable through political action,
this approach once seriously attempted was more successful.
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Analysis of the Catholic Nationalists’ social factors shows that politicization
would prove to be the most successful policy in ending the IRA. While not all Catholics
supported the terrorist tactics of the IRA, the Catholic community did support members
of the IRA in securing their communities from British troops who acted undemocratically
and unjustly. Many British troops and police collaborated with Loyalist terrorist groups.
This made military and police presence a real danger to Catholic civilians. Many
civilians gave donations, safe housing, praise and support to the IRA. This public
support created challenges for the British in many other areas such as intelligence
collecting. It ended when the population saw that they were adequately represented in
the political process and could count on due process under the law.
Lastly, the IRA became well armed over the years. While the organization was an
asymmetrical opponent of the British military, it met the military with rising capabilities.
Because of those decades passed while the IRA and the British military exchanged blows,
millions of pounds were spent and thousands of lives were lost. Despite these
investments in time, money and lives, this conflict still ended in a military stalemate. The
British military could not defeat the IRA because it was not suitable for the task or the
challenge – politicization was.
Politicization succeeded for all these reasons. The IRA sought minimal political
concessions. Until the British finally gave up trying to kill off the organization altogether
and sought political accommodation, no progress was made.
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Aum Shinrikyo Case Study
Background
Historical
Aum Shinrikyo was created in 1984 as a meditation group, and was originally
made up of only fifteen members.74 Aum incorporated aspects of Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Christianity, and spread from Japan to Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Australia, and
the United States. Due to a booming economy and Japan’s post WWII rejection of
imperialism and new protections of religious freedom, the group was able to grow into a
religious cult, and prepared to use terrorism as a means to its goals undetected by
government and the police.75 Aum ended up staging at least twenty attacks between 1990
and 1995, half of which biological attacks and the other half chemical ones.76
The organization was founded and lead for the duration of its life by Shoko
Asahara. Asahara was a paranoid and competitive individual who thought of himself in
ways that could be compared to Nostradamus, the second coming of Christ or the
Buddha. Because Aum was one of many religious organizations popping up in Japan
during this time period, and one whose leaders could not accept rejection, hostilities with
Japanese society were ignited from the beginning. This obsessive sense of competition,
paranoia, and existential threat was what drove his once yoga based religious group to
gradually take on a radical world view, eventually resulting in terrorism.77 This
competition turned into an existential struggle for survival against other organizations,
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critics and the government. This transition took place over a period of about thirteen
years as the organization officially ended in 1997.78
Aum’s original goal was to attain a high level of spirituality through meditation
and living a modest lifestyle. This seemingly innocent goal began to change when a
member was accidently killed during a religious ritual. Teruyuki Majima was mentally
ill, and when he went into a seizure during a ritual, Asahara ordered he be cooled down.
He was kept in a bath of water so cold that he died.79 When Asahara ordered that his
body be secretly disposed of, many members became frightened and began to question
the legitimacy of the group. Many considered leaving. Asahara ordered that Aum
members who knew of the accidental death and wanted to leave the group be killed.80
This transformation of Aum from a religious group that practiced yoga to a
terrorist organization continued when Asahara sought to run for election. He was
overconfident that the Japanese electorate would give full support to him and his list of
candidates. In winning this election, Asahara through that Aum Shinrikyo would gain
further national and international influence. Aum was confident that it would be taking
over the Japanese government. When it failed Aum distained interaction with Japanese
open society even more than before the election. According to Asahara, society had
committed a horrible crime by rejecting Aum, and therefore the Japanese electorate
became an enemy.81 This also worsened Asahara’s extreme paranoia. Because he
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considered it impossible for his cult to be rejected or loose legitimately he created
delusions of multiple conspiracies that would explain his failure.82
Aum’s acts of violence (such as murder) continued throughout the organization’s
existence, but the evolution to terrorism began as a reaction to Asahara’s political failure.
To further its violent capabilities Aum began its quest for the acquisition of weapons.
Because Asahara had been denied a position as an official member of the state, he
apparently believed that he would have to seize the power he thought he deserved and so
sought to develop military and weapons capabilities on his own. The list of those
Asahara sought to assassinate became broader. For example, these targets included
critics, government officials such as judges and human rights workers. An example of
this is when Aum planted sarin around the perimeter of a housing development where
three judges lived in 1994.83 These judges were involved in a case raised by local
citizens who did not want an Aum headquarters in their community. The attack killed
seven people, and injured many more. Also, earlier in 1989, Tsusumi Sakamoto, a
human rights lawyer, was murdered along with his wife and fourteen month old son for
aiding concerned families of Aum members who sought to get their family members out
of the group.84 This apocalyptic vision that motivated the organization was continued
until Aum’s dissolution and conversion into Aleph.85 86
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Political Factors
Many aspects of the changing international situation were introduced after WWII,
through the post-Cold War period, and after the Persian Gulf War made a difference with
Aum. The post WWII atmosphere in Japan introduced many previously unknown
political and religious freedoms. Civil liberties were very important to both citizens and
the government and therefore the legal structure was highly influenced by individual
rights. This coincidently was an obstacle in detecting Aum as a dangerous group.
Protections against government infringement on individuals and on religious
organizations were strong, and highly valued by society. This atmosphere let Aum’s
activities go undetected for a long time.87
Also, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Eastern Europe and Asia experienced
many changes. Russia, for example, was left with an increasing unemployment rate, the
economy was broken down and people had little faith left in anything. This vulnerability
was an asset to Aum for a few reasons. First of all, it was a good place to recruit
members. Many Russians were enthusiastic to join a group that gave their lives meaning.
Also, because of the end of the cold war many Russian weapons scientists were
unemployed. Aum solicited them to contribute to its weapons development efforts.
Soviet weapons experts were quickly hired by Aum.
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of the Persian Gulf
War fulfilled some of Asahara’s prophecies.88 This strengthened membership not just in
Japan, but in various places around the world.89
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The political atmosphere is an important part of the analysis because it shows the
constraints under which the police and government were working. Police in Japan, just
like in the United States, often run into dead ends when trying to prosecute a case
because of legal limitations on their ability to intrude on people’s civil rights. There must
be probable cause or a warrant to use surveillance; all religious groups share protections
from the state, such as tax exemptions, and people have the right to retain a certain
amount of uninterrupted privacy. Because individual, religious and political freedoms
were taken so seriously after WWII, the police would not easily have been able to prevent
these disasters from happening, or foresee that they would happen. After Aum’s 1995
Tokyo subway attack, however the country learned that they would have to be able to
protect peoples’ freedoms while ensuring their security as well. The sarin attack on the
Tokyo subway was Aum’s most fatal and large scale attack. Twelve people died, and about
6,000 were injured. It was this attack that demonstrated to Japanese officials that something had
to be done about Aum Shinrikyo.90

Key Players
Key players and institutions involved in the conflict consist of individual
members of Aum, the Japanese community and those institutions involved with the
police force, such as the standard police force, detectives, intelligence officers, and other
bureaucracies that were developed to aid the police. In particular, the Public Security
Intelligence Agency, Japanese Criminal Affairs Bureau, Security Bureau, Task Force for
Toxic Agent Attack, National Police Agency, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department,
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and Japanese Self-Defense Forces were involved in the collection of intelligence, creation
of anti-terrorist legislation, capture of Aum members and prosecution of those involved
from Aum Shinrikyo.91

Motives
Aum Shinrikyo’s motives were found in their quasi-religious/millenarian
ideology. The purpose of the Aum faith was for all to ascend the levels of consciousness
until they obtained nirvana. Asahara was the only member to have reached the highest
level. Aum was composed of many different world religions, and even mystical beliefs
taken from Nostradamus. It was believed that World War III would be fought between
Japan and the United States, and the world would be destroyed by nuclear weapons.
Japan would face Armageddon, and be attacked with radiological and chemical weapons.
Only people with good karma would survive – karma that could only be attained with
training from the Aum organization.92
Because of this ideology, Aum justified mass murder as a way of saving souls.
Rather than people being killed in sin, they would be killed in the interest of their own
salvation through Aum.93 Killing was justified in that those killed were purified.
Because they were murdered, their souls were freed and that person could receive
salvation. Furthermore, because of Asahara’s doomsday prophesies, this justification fit
the mold for mass murder (as in the subway Sarin gas attack). Believing in Aum was the
only way to survive the end of the world. Humanity could be spiritually freed by killing
all those who opposed or threatened the organization. Because of these beliefs, and the
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shady practices that were taken to justify them, many Japanese citizens took action to
have Aum shut down.94
Based on Aum’s motivations and ideology, it is understandable that there would
have been absolutely no room for negotiation of any kind. In Louise Richardson’s terms,
Aum’s goals were transformational. They believe to be serving a spiritual duty, and Aum
(obeying Asahara) was the only way of fulfilling that duty.95

Social Factors (public support)
Aum Shinrikyo had very little to no support outside of the organization itself.
Family members tried multiple ways of getting their loved ones to leave the group, and
citizens lobbied to keep Aum facilities out of their neighborhoods. In one incident, in the
Kameido district of Tokyo, many citizens complained of a strange, foul odor coming
from Aum Headquarters and worried about their health. The Department of the
Environment inspected the area on multiple occasions. Human rights lawyers and
detectives were hired by families’ whose relatives moved into Aum compounds and
headquarters, gave up their lives to Asahara and began to participate in questionable
activities.96 Non profit organizations along with government programs were developed to
aid Aum members in leaving the group, and provide safety and protection for them in the
event they did leave. Aum Shinrikyo Victims Society was one of these. These programs
further educated young people against the advantages that Aum might claim to provide.97
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The lack of public support for Aum is important for a few reasons. It shows that
police had a few advantages over Aum. Citizens voluntarily contacted police with
information regarding the organization. This kind of information included membership
information – many family members asked for help getting their relatives out of the
organization. Citizens also tipped off police as to what was going on in their facilities –
strange odors and activities were occasionally reported.

Threat Analysis
Organizational Structure
Aum Shinrikyo was organized in a pyramidal structure with Shoko Asahara at the
top as the spiritual guru who was the only one to have achieved the elevated state of
Nirvana. Because of his spiritual stature he acted as the monarch of the organization.
Below Asahara were those members in each level of spiritual consciousness. Those who
had reached higher levels of spirituality became close associates of Asahara. They were
trusted with the more sensitive jobs – ones that may cause other members to think twice
about their membership, defect, or question the organization’s validity. Each level was
divided by personal spiritual achievement. To display their progression, each level wore
a different color robe.98 To rise in the ranks of Aum, members would pay fees, reject
family or activities they participated in as part of their normal lives, and pass tests of
dedication. This structure was maintained throughout Aum’s duration, however after
Asahara lost the election, the organization shifted slightly to mirror the Japanese
government. They created a pseudo-government of Japan within themselves.99 These
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stations turned into a twelve member ministry, a head of the House Agency and a
Secretariat.100
The police made a big impact on the organization when key Aum leaders were
arrested. Asahara’s arrest, as the only fully enlightened person in Aum and therefore
their figurehead, had the largest impact as Aum’s spiritual guru was now taken away.
There were arrests of others in high positions, and as they occurred the organization
began to decay.101

Capabilities
Although Aum had very large financial resources, its ability to successfully
construct and deploy biological and chemical weapons was shaky at best. Their ability to
construct deadly biological agents was a failure, and though their ability to build harmful
chemical agents was successful, they were never used in a way that caused truly massive
casualties as Aum would have liked. Luckily, this capability was shut down before it was
used to kill even more than the 12 who died from Sarin gas poisoning in the Tokyo
subway incident.
Due to the organization’s inherent paranoia, members mostly sought out methods
for creating biological and chemical weapons themselves, rather than seeking outside
expertise with the exceptions of their Russian counterpart.102 Because the organization
was so small, its biological weapons acquisition was largely unsuccessful in many ways.
Aum tried to use botulinum toxins on many occasions in terrorist attacks, but fortunately,
no one was ever harmed. Examples of other biological weapons attempts included efforts
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to seek out the Ebola virus and Q fever, and an attempt to disperse anthrax into the
atmosphere from the roof of Aum headquarters. After numerous attempts, the small
biological weapons program was a failure. They were never able to produce toxins that
were strong enough to be fatal. Possible explanations for their failures may be that the
engineers of the group did not know that they were working with unthreatening strands of
anthrax, viruses were improperly cultivated or they were prepared incorrectly.103
Their chemical weapon capability, however, was more successful. Aum had its
own chemical plant where it could produce large quantities of chemical agents and the
materials needed to weaponize the chemicals. Aum had further laboratories and testing
facilities in Australia.104 It is most likely that Aum was successful with chemical agents
because it obtained the Russian blueprints for sarin.105 The actual blueprints were never
found, however Russian experts may have visited Aum facilities and aided in the process.
The agents were synthesized in the same manner as those found in the Soviet stockpiles.
Other than sarin, Aum used VX (another chemical weapon compound) in assassinations,
but it was only developed in small quantities. A few conventional weapons were also
acquired, such as AK-47s and bombs.106
Aum Shinrikyo had very large resources, and the potential for further resources
due to its international branches. It had the ability to hire foreign scientists and travel
without suspicion. One argument as to why chemical abilities were successful and
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biological weapon efforts were not is because these financial resources were put to better
use in this field.

Outcome
Why police efforts in the conflict were successful as opposed to other options
Little government action was taken to deter or shut down Aum Shinrikyo until
after the 1995 Tokyo subway attack. The efforts that ended Aum are a good example of
efficient police response along with exceptional cooperation between the police, the
intelligence agency, and the legislature. In response to terrorism in Japan, the police force
employed conventional skills they already had, but also developed new ones for the
specific situation. The more conventional uses of police action involved raids of all
known estate owned by or leased to Aum. Evidence was found that consisted of plastic
bags with sarin in them and poisonous chemicals such as phosphorus trichlride
stockpiles, illegal drugs, chemicals for the production of sarin, sodium cyanide,
hydrochloric acid, chloroform, phenylacetonitrile, glycerol, etc.107 When police entered
and investigated Aum facilities, they were further led to members. Arrests of key
members, Asahara in particular, impeded the organization’s ability to operate.
Furthermore, successful interrogation led the police to various other members on every
level. Members were indicted for charges ranging anywhere from the subway gas attack,
illegal production of drugs, possession of narcotics and hallucinogens, kidnapping,
murder and other acts of violence.108
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As the investigation brought out more and more facts, further actions were taken
such as increasing patrols in neighborhoods to make citizens feel more secure, offering
consolation services to members of Aum and their families who wanted to leave the cult
and return to normal life, setting up temporary police stations in open lots that surrounded
Aum compounds, and offering counseling services to victims.109 Police sponsored
programs were installed in child-care clinics and in schools to educate young people and
to help Aum members who had fled.
The National Police Agency also had to evolve with the new threat. There was a
terrorist organization using terror tactics that they had not anticipated, so the NPA had to
learn how to adapt to the situation. For example, they created a bureau that specialized in
toxic agents. This was called the Task Force for Toxic Agent Attack in Tokyo
Subway.110 Also, detectives from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department were
specifically responsible for investigations, rescue of victims and securing witnesses even
though each police station had a department for investigations that would report to
headquarters at the National Police Agency Criminal Investigation Bureau. Roles were
distributed within the police department, and between stations. All together, about 2,500
police department members were involved in the investigation.111
Also, because the police had little prior experience in dealing with dangerous
chemicals, they quickly, and effectively (relative to the amount of time they had)
acquired information on chemical and biological agents, their manufacturing processes,
where they are located, and who their buyers were. To ramp up knowledge about
109
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chemical and biological agents, NPA, regional police bureau and prefectural police
stations each became involved in scientific studies including the study of chemistry,
organized crime analysis, physics, public security, and other related topics. These were
directed through the Police Policy Research Center. The Japanese military (Japanese
Self-Defense Forces – JSDF) also aided the police in that they sent chemical-warfare
experts to help police, and established a joint police and army investigative unit.
The NPA also worked with the Japanese Criminal Affairs Bureau and the Security
Bureau. The Public Security Intelligence Agency was the primary intelligence agency
involved directly with the police. They put Aum under surveillance.
To further assist the police in capturing Aum members, the legislature passed
legislation that gave the police additional powers to hunt Aum. For example, an antiAum law was created to give police greater ability to conduct surveillance of Aum, and
then later on, Aleph. Aleph must submit member lists and explanation of group
activities. Tokyo district court forced Aum’s break up as a religious institution under
Religious Corporation Law, and religious status was revoked under various statutes.112
The reason for this was that the organization did not service the public good.
The Japanese Parliament passed the Law Related to the Prevention of Bodily
Harm Caused by Sarin and Similar Substances.113 This prohibited the manufacture,
possession and use of chemical and biological agents that could be used as weapons
against society. Also, the Act Pertaining to Control of Organizations that Commit
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Indiscriminate Murder was established.114 Courts helped victims receive compensation
from Aum. Aum’s assets were frozen, and allocated to victims and their relatives.
Because the Japanese police used similar guidelines for analysis, they chose an
effective first response that proved successful. By analyzing organizational structure,
tactics, strategies, background information, and ideology, they were able to make a clear
decision. Furthermore, Japan was a strong state, with legitimate control over its police
force. Also with the little to no public support for the organization police were welcomed
into communities and aided with any information that citizens had available. In many
cases neighborhoods would work with the police in helping educate young people against
the group and help others leave.115 The lack of public support for the organization is
always a contributing factor to policing efforts in almost any circumstances. Another
indicator that policing was a good policy was that Aum Shinrikyo, as a religious cult, had
no interest in, or anything to gain from, negotiating politically. And even though Aum
had a decent weapons arsenal, they were never a match for the JSDF. Because of the
hierarchical organizational structure of Aum Shinrikyo, the arrest of key leaders made a
big impact on the lower levels of the organization. This was especially true when
members were faced with interrogation, and the opportunity to report on their comembers. Police also have the power to arrest based on crimes other than terrorism.
They were able to make arrests based on crimes that funded the organization such as drug
sales and fraud, as well as crimes that were intended to increase the organization’s
security, such as murder, assassination, and kidnappings.116 The legal system also works
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in police’s favor. Legislation can be created to aid in the capture and prosecution of
perpetrators.117

Conclusion
The Aum Shinrikyo case is a good example of how a government thoroughly
analyzed a terrorist organization and the context in which it operated, and applied a
successful counterterrorism strategy. In particular, the political and social atmospheres,
level of public support, and Aum’s capabilities give substantial evidence to conclude that
policing was an effective and successful policy. The political atmosphere shows how the
Japanese police, military, intelligence, and government pulled together in cooperation in
order to achieve a larger goal. Because of the Japanese’s value for democracy and rights,
and the fact that the police operated within this set of values, the population did not see
police as infringing on their sense of safety and security.118 In fact, communities
welcomed the police into their neighborhoods to investigate, make arrests, and to patrol.
Citizens often aided the police in intelligence collecting, such as by calling tips into the
police station when they noticed anything suspicious.
The police were also highly effective in arresting Aum members, even when they
could not be charged with murder or the attack on the Tokyo Subway. They had the
background and skills to investigate and make arrests based on activities such as drug
sales, money laundering, tax evasion, etc. Aum had what seemed to be unlimited
resources, and those resources often came from illegal activities.119 The police were able
to apprehend many Aum members based on alternative charges connected with Aum’s
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financial activities. These explanations show how police work was extremely effective.
The police were able to work with other government and law enforcement institutions, as
well as civilians to weed out the terrorists.
A military approach would not have been able to do as well as the police without
creating more damage. The military could have done more harm than good by initiating
large scale attacks on Aum, or by appearing to threaten freedom in exchange in Japanese
security. Military forces also do not possess the investigative skills and authorities
needed in this case.
Politicization would not have been possible either, because of the nature of Aum’s
motivations. Their goals were neither narrow (in Jones’ and Libiki’s language) or
temporal (in Richardson’s language). Because the organization was based on a religious
belief that motivated members to go so far as to kill others, they would not have
sacrificed their beliefs for the sake of negotiation and compromise, short of being given
control of the Japanese government. Policing was the most effective counterterrorism
policy.

Al-Qaeda in al-Anbar Case Study
Background
Historical
After invading Iraq in 2003, American troops faced multiple threats. After the
fall of Saddam Hussein, the insurgency consisted of groups with various allegiances –
Ba’athists, Salafist-jihadists, assorted nationalists, sectarian militant groups, criminals,
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and extremists such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).120 For years the United States fought
local tribes and other insurgent organizations that had joined forces with al-Qaeda in Iraq.
These insurgents fought against the U.S. occupation and the Iraqi government. They saw
the new Iraqi government as illegitimate and Americans as invaders. Though al-Qaeda
and the insurgents of Iraq had different long-term goals, they used each other to gain
certain short-term goals; in particular, to end the U.S. occupation and the occupation of
Muslim land by Christians. Furthermore, the insurgents and al-Qaeda were Sunni, and
the Americans were helping the Shi’a-led government. This shows that insurgent-AQI
cooperation was in many cases an alliance of convenience; they shared a common
enemy.121 While insurgents and AQI worked side by side, AQI quickly rose in
prominence and power and became the dominant group in the alliance under Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi.122
Tribesmen eventually grew tiresome of al-Qaeda’s growing control of their
territories, their intimidation, assassinations of their family members, and their monopoly
on the tribe’s economic resources. Many al-Anbar tribal leaders’ primary source of
funding was illegal activities, which AQI began to make inroads into. Al-Qaeda also
started kidnappings, assassinations, torture, and decapitation of sheikhs and their family
members who tried to prevent al-Qaeda from wresting both financial and tactical control
from tribal leaders.123 Insurgent and AQI interests divided because AQI did not have the
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Iraqis’ interests in mind so much as it did al-Qaeda’s extremist doctrine as applied by alZarqawi. The alliance between the insurgents and al-Qaeda made up the Mujahideen
Shura Council (MSC). The MSC further transformed into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
with the induction of other insurgent groups. This was al-Qaeda’s first step in trying to
create a caliphate with its seeds in Iraq. In reality, the ISI was never much more than a
propaganda move – it never governed territory or performed any of the functions of a
state (other than trying to impose Sharia law in areas where it had a significant presence).
The Awakening movement followed shortly after the creation of the ISI. Tribes
began to loose their individual identities to al-Qaeda in Iraq.124 Al-Qaeda’s campaign of
intimidation was successful to this point, as much of al-Anbar was considered “no-go”
zones (e.g., much of Ramadi and Fallujah). Security forces and police were ineffective.
Less than a hundred Iraqi police showed up for work at any given time, and those who
did rarely left the police station.125 Attempts by tribes to come together to stop al-Qaeda
had failed in the past, such as what happened with the al-Anbar People’s Council and
other nationalist Iraqi insurgents led by Ibrahim al-Shamari.126 This was the tipping
point of the insurgents’ allegiances, and the beginning of the successes of American
outreach and confidence-building measures with tribal leaders. These confidencebuilding gestures took many shapes throughout the counterinsurgency efforts.
In 2006, Sunni tribal sheikhs began to change their allegiances and approaches –
changes that would come to fruition in mid-2007. Tribal leaders began forming secret
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alliances with the U.S. military against al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda began to be seen as a threat
to the tribal leaders’ sense of power in the region, and to their safety. Leaders also began
to trust Americans. The major threat to al-Anbar used to be U.S. military,
democratization and support for the new Iraqi government, but al-Qaeda proved to be a
still greater threat.127 To gain the trust of the tribes, the U.S. military sent money to the
tribes themselves, which in turn gave Sunni tribal militias funding, arms, and legitimacy
and the sheikhs a source of patronage.128 Sheikh Sattar, the leader of the tribal
awakening before he was assassinated, was responsible for bringing together twenty-five
of the thirty-one tribes in al-Anbar against al-Qaeda in what became known as the alAnbar Salvation Council. Sheikhs of the member tribes encouraged the young men of
their tribes to join the police forces in towns such as Ramadi and Fallujah across al-Anbar
province (a major change). By December of 2006, police membership had doubled in
only a few months.129
It was not until this point that the U.S. military had any control whatsoever over
insurgent activities. Another change that let the sheikhs’ trust Americans was the fact
that they were convinced that U.S. forces would eventually leave. Not only did they
know that the Americans would leave, but believed that they would not leave until the
terrorist threat was ended.130 This shows that these sheikhs did not view the U.S. is not a
competing power, but a complementary one to the tribes. Also, it showed that the
Americans were not going to escalate the conflict between the Iraqis and AQI, only to
leave them to fend for themselves. The Marines and Army needed not only the Iraqi
127
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Army (IA) and the Iraqi Police (IP) to contribute, but also the populace and local leaders.
Otherwise, any counterinsurgency (COIN) victory would be temporary at best. After the
area was taken back from AQI, Iraqis were given the responsibility for their home areas
so that AQI could not regain ground after the Americans left.131
Relations between Americans and insurgents were further confirmed when the
sheikhs and other militias were given the authority to guard their own areas and
neighborhoods. Furthermore, sheikhs were paid directly so that they could distribute the
money themselves. This gave sheikhs the ability to distribute patronage, and so regain
their legitimacy in their tribes. This helped the populace to fall in line with the sheikhs’
decisions. The United States decided on this approach, because trying to force
democratization and capitalism was working against U.S. efforts, rather than
complementing them. Instead of insisting on direct control, U.S. forces exercised less
control and allowed tribal leaders to do business as they saw fit. They accepted the
cultural differences, and noticed how important these differences were to the tribes’
identity.132
It is important to remember that while the coalition forces were successful in
confidence-building with the tribes, this does not mean they are on the same side. They
were both working to a common goal, but they were doing so because it was in both
side’s self-interest.133
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Political Factors: Key Players
Major threats that coalition forces faced were elements of the former regime:
Ba’athists, Fedayeen Saddam, and intelligence agencies, as well as extremists: terrorist
groups, especially jihadists from Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Yemen.
Insurgents
The insurgents were made up of Sunni Arabs who were opposed to an Iraqi
government dominated by Shi’a Arabs. They originally fought along side al-Qaeda
because of their distain for the American occupation, American aid to and support of the
Shi’a and the Iraqi government, and because AQI initially appeared to be a possible
“defender of the Sunnis.” Once al-Qaeda’s extremist nature became evident however,
and it started becoming the dominant influence in al-Anbar, tribal leaders sided with the
American military in counterinsurgency operations to drive al-Qaeda out of their
province.134

Violent extremists
AQI led the insurgency under the guise of protecting Muslim countries against
foreign domination. There were also many other insurgent groups, that ranged from
hard-core jihadists similar to al-Qaeda, to Sunni-nationalist movements that wanted to
remove the “occupier.” While some insurgents and AQI had different long-term agendas,
they both sought, through different means and methods, to expel Americans from Iraq
and to bring down the Iraqi government.135

134

Bruce Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006, (Washington DC: Rand
Corporation, 2008), p. 25.
135
Ibid., p. 28.

54

Iraqi Police
Under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, the Iraqi Police (IP) were poorly
trained, poorly armed and highly corrupt. After the fall of Saddam, the IP largely
dispersed into their region’s insurgent groups. Once cooperation between the American
soldiers and the insurgents began coalition forces unofficially, and then later officially
with the authorization of Ambassador Bremer, trained any young, willing and able men
they could find. IP training was brief.136 The National Police force – which came into
being after the Coalition Provisional Authority had departed, was largely more effective
than the local police units. For a long time however the national police force was
dominated by Shi’a Arabs, and were a threat to the Sunni local populace.
It was difficult to recruit local police at the onset. This was because the
population did not support the government, and because of the threat posed to members
of the police and their families in many parts of Iraq, and especially in Anbar. For
example, AQI had bombed recruiting centers and targeted police.137
The turning point came when the Anbar sheikhs turned against AQI. Once the
Sheikhs permitted it, Iraqi police force recruitment provided jobs in the province and
helped economically. This was important because the province was very poor, and many
AQI recruits were from families in desperate need of money.138 This gave them
incentive to fight on the side of the coalition forces rather than al-Qaeda.
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Iraqi Army
Under the Ba’ath regime, the Iraqi Army was largely Shi’a conscripts – but the
leadership was mostly Sunni.139 The IA oppressed Kurds and Shi’as for a long period of
time. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was responsible for the development of
the new Iraqi Army with a focus on internal security. The IA however was under funded
and under armed. There was a large capabilities gap between U.S. forces and the IA –
both of which were going out on the same missions. It was also disorganized, in part
because it was composed of Sunnis, Kurds, and Shi’a – few of whom initially cared to
cooperate with their ethnic and sectarian colleagues.140

Threat Analysis
Organizational Structure
Al-Qaeda’s structure has taken various shapes since its existence. It transformed
from a well-structured terrorist organization with a headquarters and hierarchical
structure based in Afghanistan, to a concept that motivates movements made up of
fragments of bin Laden’s inner circle during and after Operation Enduring Freedom. It is
now a collection of various jihadist groups with hardly any command and control from an
al-Qaeda “core,” but enough influence within the movement to produce a continued
capability to operate.141
Before 9/11, al-Qaeda was an organization, with ranks of authority that made up
its hard core. This hard core consisted of various high ranking and highly trusted
associates of bin Laden. Outside of the hard core was a following of roughly 100 or so
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members who had pledged bayat to the organization. These members were mostly
loyalists drawn from around the Muslim world and committed to the jihadist ideology.142
The central core was made up of a leadership structure consisting of four layers.
First there was bin Laden, whose highest ranking partner, or associate, was Abu Ayoub
al-Iraqi. Next was the shura majlis (consultative committee). The shura majlis was
made up of mujadeens from the Soviet-Afghan war who had sworn allegiance to bin
Laden in 1989 – most notably, Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef. On the next stop down,
there were four operational committees: military, finance and business, religion and
propaganda.143

Since 9/11 al-Qaeda’s hard core no longer make up the pinnacle of the
organization’s over all structure. The core had turned into an international organization.
With a near and far enemy, the jihad became against all those who deny al-Qaeda’s
particular version of Islam. With this change, al-Qaeda has been transformed into a
cellular level organization, similar to a franchise structure. In this formation, jihadist
groups with little if any connection to al-Qaeda leaders act under its name. Some of these
groups are distinct from other al-Qaeda affiliates in that they have publicly sworn
allegiance to bin Laden and profess to be taking orders directly from al-Qaeda leaders,
while others operate with the same ideology, but in their own right. Some extremists
have definite ties to al-Qaeda, whether by finance, influence, or leadership associations.
But, they do not openly declare their collective loyalty to the organization. Some
extremists may have sworn bayat to bin Laden and are operating at al-Qaeda’s orders.144
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Basically, the terrorist threat that we associate with al-Qaeda has transformed into
a nebula of Islamic fundamentalists who use terrorism against the near or far enemy for
the sake of jihad. Rather than an organization, it has become a global jihadist concept or
movement with various levels of membership and association.145
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is one of the al-Qaeda franchises noted above. It has never been
closely tied to al-Qaeda, reporting instead to its local leader. Since the death of alZarqawi, AQ central has exerted more control than previously. Nonetheless, day to day
decisions are taken in Iraq. AQI is led, for the most part, by foreigners, but its rank and
file is almost entirely Iraqi. Within AQI, there are regional commands and a well
developed bureaucracy for handling administrative affairs and command and control. AlQaeda central does have one major influence on AQI’s ability to operate. It is
instrumental in funneling international recruits to various areas of the world in which
franchises are active. Currently, it seems that most recruits are going to other theaters,
thus depriving AQI of the steady stream of suicide bombers it employed so successfully
in 2006 and 2007.146
Motives
AQI has many reasons for being in Iraq. First, the overall al-Qaeda doctrine seeks
to expel any foreign presence from Muslim lands. This is true in Iraq, and a priority in
other Muslim states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the big
picture, al-Qaeda is working towards developing a caliphate – and it hoped that the
Islamic State of Iraq would be a starting point for this effort. It sought to influence the
Sunni population in the area to share AQI’s version of Islam, and to act in accordance

145
146

Ibid., p. 74.
Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, p. 90.

58

with its doctrine. Because of these extreme motivations there is little room to negotiate
any kind of settlement. Furthermore, with over 1,000 members in force and access to
weapons stockpiles, a typical police force alone would be no match for such an
insurgency.147 With the high level of recruits from Sunni tribes, however, enough
officers were trained to take back the area and the populace.

Social Factors: Public Support
In 2006, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated
that AQI’s core membership was in a range of more than 1,000.148 With suicide bombing
being AQI’s most commonly used and most efficient tactic, new recruits were constantly
ushered in from Iraq and abroad. AQI’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the
group maintains or takes advantage of an extensive logistical network throughout the
Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia and Europe.149
Capabilities
Operationally, AQI seemed to favor suicide and road-side bomb attacks –
typically using cars and other motor vehicles. Tactics included suicide bombs, and other
intimidation tactics such as video releases of beheadings and torture. Furthermore, AQI
has attempted to develop chemical weapons. For example, a facility was found that
shows that AQI was trying to develop chlorine bombs. While the American military got
to the factory before any of the chemicals were too harmful, it shows that AQI had the
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ball in motion towards chemical weapons.150 The raid on this factory in Karma captured
an arsenal of five vehicles, mortar and artillery rounds, homemade bombs, propane tanks
and three 55-gallon barrels of chlorine. Another three barrels in the factory contained
nitroglycerine, a chemical used as an accelerant for explosives.
While AQI receives recruits from both Iraq and abroad, the organization also
receives material support from the larger al-Qaida nebula. Also, local criminal activities
fund many of the AQI’s operations. Many of these criminal activities were those formerly
dominated by the Sunni tribes for economic resources. The monopolization of these
criminal opportunities by AQI was one of the reasons the Sunnis split from AQI.151 AQI
also receives funds from donors in the Middle East and Europe, local sympathizers in
Iraq, a variety of businesses and criminal activities and other international extremists
throughout the world. In many cases, AQI's donors are probably motivated by support
for the extreme version of Islam typical of these terrorist groups, rather than affiliation
with any specific terrorist group.152

Outcome
The U.S. used traditional COIN techniques while developing security forces, and
developing human and physical infrastructure.153 The U.S. military decided to center
attacks on al-Qaeda safe havens and from there have the Iraqis establish a permanent
presence to keep the terrorists from returning. Combat outposts were erected in
neighborhoods. These were staffed with American troops, Iraqi soldiers and Iraqi police.
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Also, neighborhood watches were created and staffed with tribal militias who were
screened to be Provincial Auxiliary Iraqi Police.154

These positions were legitimated by

giving pay, bonuses, uniforms, weapons and the responsibility to their own
community.155 Also to secure confidence from tribal leaders, they were given direct
security tasks, such as establishing checkpoints at all chokepoints into the communities.
COIN strategy also included intelligence and targeted killing of terrorist leaders. This
model has been repeated in other parts of Iraq.156 Iraqi tribal members helped identify
AQI members, and criminals involved in terrorist activities for the United States to target.
What is important in this COIN strategy is that U.S. forces have recently made
only small footprints, leaving paramilitary efforts to Iraqi security forces where possible.
This is important because local forces have more legitimacy within their regions, and are
more accepted by the population. While the U.S. does still engage in combat on many
occasions, it is more important that this role be passed off to local forces with American
support. In particular, Americans killing Muslims gives the United States less support
and influence in Muslim areas. American participation in combat can heighten Muslim
grievances towards American presence in their land, and possibly influence terrorist
recruitment.157
Iraqis were originally trained very quickly, and only well enough to do a
minimally effective job pushing back AQI. The Iraqis, however, were able to hold their
territory on their own once AQI was gone. This is crucial because if they were not
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capable of doing so, AQI would retake the territory once American forces left and Iraqis
let their guard down. Because the Iraqi security forces became competent in securing
their own areas, US troops were able to move on to other areas in order to train new units
in counterinsurgency.158 Iraqi security force training is a job in progress – additional
training is continuing to this day.
Intelligence is crucial to any counterterrorism effort. In this case, the Sunni allies
were what changed intelligence efforts from an unsuccessful, to an extremely successful,
effort against AQI. Because many of the insurgents formerly worked with AQI and
shared a community they knew first hand who was and who was not involved in any
given organization.159 Also, the Sunnis working with coalition forces became protectors
and guardians of their tribes, which created confidence within the communities where
AQI members were likely to try to find safe haven.160 While infiltrating al-Qaeda is
nearly impossible in most cases, it is not so difficult to identify AQI members who are
living in the community.161 Also, signals intelligence is important in intercepting phone
conversations and emails.162
Working with locals in the provinces made intelligence significantly more
effective. Because tribes are made up of very strong, close-knit social relationships,
locals know full well who is and who is not an insurgent or al-Qaeda member. U.S.
forces alone would never be able to distinguish between Iraqis (or even Arabs) well
158
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enough to be successful in COIN operations.163 Because they had sided with U.S.
efforts, it became clear to AQI that its main enemy now was the tribesmen who
transformed themselves into anti-AQI paramilitary forces and a police force.
By March 2007, AQI was largely run out of al-Anbar with the exception of
Fallujah. Just the year before, al-Qaeda controlled ninety percent of the province.164 By
mid-2008, Fallujah was safe enough for the Marines to turn over their base to Iraqis and
take most of their forces out of the area. This was all accomplished quickly due to the
alliance between the Anbar tribes and U.S. forces; an alliance that produced the needed
intelligence for U.S. and Iraqi forces to act decisively, and leave a large number of
minimally trained, under armed, inexperienced, poor, young Iraqi men able to maintain
security.

Conclusion
Military action was the best counterterrorism strategy in Iraq. In an insurgency, it
is highly unlikely in most cases that police action or politicization are feasible options.
This is because insurgencies are often too large in numbers and strong in weapons
capabilities. Also, it is not uncommon that they use guerilla warfare along with terrorism
tactics of intimidation such as roadside bombs, beheadings and suicide bombs. These are
situations that police are usually unable to handle due to the level and pervasiveness of
violence. Along with military action, the U.S. and Iraqis working with the U.S. had the
upper hand in intelligence collecting as well. Because of the close social structure of the
tribes in al-Anbar, al-Qaeda members were easily identifiable, and killed.
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Also, al-

Qaeda’s motives were and are religious. In this case, its religious leaders use Islam as a
reason to kill others (and themselves) to achieve their ultimate goal. As in the case of
Aum Shinrikyo, their goals could not be accommodated politically. Someone who blows
themselves up in order to intimidate and kill others is not likely to be persuaded to stop
using violence and compromise as part of a political settlement.

Conclusion
This study illustrates that by thoroughly assessing specific aspects of a terrorist
organization and the context in which it operates, particular counterterrorism strategies
are indicated. The three most successfully deployed policies are those that are dominated
by politicization, policing, and military efforts. Each of these policy themes is either
complemented by the others, or sub-policies. Intelligence, for example, is a sub-theme
that plays a crucial role in any counterterrorism situation. In each case examined here,
the characteristics of the terrorist organization and the situation indicate the appropriate
policy option .
Politicization is most successfully deployed when organizations have narrow
goals such as regime change, reforms in policy, social change or land reform. Like the
experience of the FMLN and the IRA shows, opening up the political arena and engaging
in negotiations on these issues was enough to satisfy both parties. One can look at these
cases as situations in which people feel that violence is their only way to be heard. If
other options – specifically access to the political process – are made available, violence
becomes less attractive. In many cases, if members of an organization feel that they can
make a change through the political process they will choose politics over violence.
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Politicization benefits the state as well. Significant resources, both human and monetary
go into combating terrorism which can be better used for other purposes.
Policing is most successful in situations when an organization is unable to be
stopped nonviolently, is small enough that the military does not need to be involved and
when there is a mature state with a trusted government. Police have many advantages
compared to the military in these circumstances. In the Aum Shinrikyo case, the
Japanese police could easily gain intelligence on the organization because they were
integrated into the community – more so than Aum. Also, police may have records of
previous offenses of the members of terrorist groups. This makes it easier to track
potential terrorists. Furthermore, police can use the law to their advantage to incarcerate
potential terrorists on other charges such as fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking and
assault – crimes that almost always go hand in hand with terrorist group activities. Police
are already a familiar face in communities. Legislation can also be passed that give the
police increased capabilities for search and seizures, surveillance and the criminalizing of
other activities that terrorists need to function. Furthermore, the police are less
intimidating to the community than the military, and have different skills that are more
appropriate for security efforts in free societies.
Lastly, the military option is most effective in the case when terrorists are capable
of violence that police cannot handle – as in an insurgency – or when there is not a
mature government and police force. For example, as we have seen some experts assert
that when the terrorist organization is larger than 1,000 members, military is usually more
efficient than police. This is also the case with the type of weapons capabilities of the
organization. Like al-Qaeda, many organizations have a wide range of financial, and
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human resources. They receive donations, and volunteers and recruits from around the
Muslim world. These are often situations that police are not trained to deal with.
Finally, note that the threat posed by terrorists may change over time. Conditions
may dictate one policy initially, and another later on. This is the case in al-Anbar, where
the initial military response was necessary due to the violent capabilities of al-Qaeda and
the nascent capabilities of the police forces. This military policy is now being replaced
by a policy that relies more heavily on police, as al-Qaeda’s capabilities wane and the
police forces grow.
By using a case study to illustrate each of these points it is evident that such an
analytical structure works. By assessing each organization based on history, political and
social contexts, level of public support and threat analysis, specific truths become
evident. This should be viewed however as an indication that such an approach may be
useful, but more research would be needed to make the case stronger. By examining only
three cases, it is possible that the conclusions are biased by the particular circumstances
of each. A thorough examination of more cases would help us gain a deeper
understanding of how policy options for countering terrorist organizations are tied to the
characteristics of these organizations, and the context in which they operate.
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